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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




RALPH M. EVANS and ROYAL 
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, INC., 
a California corporation, 
Defendants and 
Appellants, 
Case No. 14407 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a civil action brought by plaintiff to enforce a 
contract and to collect unpaid money due as a two per cent (2%) 
commission on the sales price of a certain machine being sold 
by the defendants but in part designed and developed by the 
plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court sitting with a jury, the 
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, District Judge presiding. The jury 
found all of the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendants. The court entered judgment accordingly. From 
said verdict and judgment, defendants appeal. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
I 
Plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of the case were presented to the jury for its \ 
determination. The jurors answered special interrogatories re-
quested by defendants and made findings in accordance with the 
evidence in favor of the plaintiff. In addition to answering 
the interrogatories, the jurors returned verdicts favorable to 
the plaintiff (R 575 to 589). 
A substantial percentage of the facts, as abstracted in 
appellants1 brief and contained within the abstract ordered by 
the court, does not fairly represent the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the jury's findings and the respondent herein 
or is absent from the abstract. For this reason, it will be 
necessary for respondent to frequently refer to the original 
record. It is also respectfully pointed out that none of the 
exhibits were abstracted by appellants. 
The facts hereinafter set forth represent the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn there-
from and will be viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's 
findings and verdict (Cottrell vs. Grand Union Tea Company, 
5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622; Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District vs. Nelson, 11 Utah 2d 353, 358 P.2d 81). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Walter E. Mullins, the plaintiff and respondent herein, 
is an employee of Chicago Bridge & Iron Works in Salt Lake City, 
Utah* He has been so employed for in excess of twenty years in 
the maintenance department. Defendant and appellant, Ralph M. 
Evans, at one time was a neighbor of Mullins and had prevailed 
upon him to construct a boat trailer. Mullins is talented in 
the use of his hands in the construction of equipment and ma-
chinery and possesses an abundance of workable ideas for the 
improvement of machinery* 
In the early part of 1966, Evans approached Mullins about 
constructing a new machine for laminating plastic to counter 
tops. Evans foresaw the need for a machine that would laminate 
the plastic to the wood top in one piece which would be a great 
improvement over other processes being then presently used. He 
conferred with Mullins and the two of them, after looking at 
various other devices, worked on ideas for the construction of 
the machine in question (R 488-491). Mullins was not only to 
build the machine but added his own ideas concerning safety doors, 
roller apparatus and devices which would make the machine safe 
and more workable (R 492-493). After considerable effort, 
Mullins finally manufactured the first machine at home, working 
nights and weekends. Evans then suggested that if Mullins 
would construct the machines as Evans sold them, they would both 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
hopefully make money0 They agreed Mullins would provide the 
labor in making the first machines at a very nominal charge. 
Evans would pay for the costs of the material and the nominal 
labor charges going into the first machines until the business 
got going. Thereafter, there would be a partnership in the 
profits in that Mullins was to receive a percentage (R 497, 
539, 566). Production commenced and Evans soon sold several 
machines to customers based upon the initial design and the 
picture of the first machine (Exhibit P-l). He would then 
advise Mullins of the sale and request Mullins to build and 
deliver as fast as possible (R 490-493, 496-497, 539-540). A 
larger shop was rented by Mullins and more people hired. 
Mullins calculated the approximate number of hours it took to 
make the first machine. Based upon a small labor charge for 
himself and the actual labor cost of those working with him on 
the machine,he estimated the minimum labor charge for the ma-
chine at $300.00, so that Evans could establish a sales price. 
After approximately thirty (30) machines had been sold 
by Evans, he discussed with Mullins the advantages of moving 
the manufacturing operation from Mullins1 shop in Salt Lake 
City to Glendale, Arizona where Evans was residing. It was 
suggested by Evans that they could set up a plant as partners 
and at that time, he offered Mullins a partnership in the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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business of producing and selling the machine. Mullins would 
have to move to Arizona and work with Evans in the business. 
Mullins felt that his seniority with his employer was such that 
he could not risk quitting his job and gamble on the success of 
the sales of the machines to support his family. He then dis-
cussed with Evans the possibility of Evans buying out his 
interest in the machine and his ideas contributing to the 
success of the machine for a sale price of $10,000«00 in casho 
Evans indicated he did not have sufficient capital at that time 
to make a lump-sum payment but suggested Mullins accept a two 
per cent (2%) commission on the sale price of each of the ma-
chines sold for his interest in the machine and business0 
Mullins agreed to this. Thereafter, Evans returned to Arizona 
and drew up the contract granting Mullins a 2% commission on 
the sale price of the machines. The unfinished machines, jigs, 
and other parts were moved from Salt Lake City to Arizona. 
Mullins1 brother went along with the equipment to assist Evans 
in getting into production (Exhibit P-3, R 876-877, 504-505, 
516) • 
At about this time, Evans also formed two corporations 
of which he was President. The stock in both corporations was 
owned by Evans with a few shares being held by his wife and 
children. A Mr. Alton Cherry held five shares (Exhibit D-45)a 
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i 
Thereafter, machines were manufactured at Glendale, Arizona 
under the Evans Company name and sold to the public (Exhibits 
P-l and P-5)* Evans then commenced paying 2% commissions to 
Mullins. On August 23, 1968, Evans wrote to Mullins, telling 
him they had had some difficulty with some of the machines 
having a square shaft operating the segmented roller. Because 
of the problems, they would have to discount his commission on 
31 machines to allow for the correction and conversion from the 
square to a round shaft* Mullins agreed to this. Evans appar-
ently decided thereafter to sell his lucrative business and 
entered into negotiations with defendant, Royal Industries 
Corporation, Inc., for the sale of both of the Evans corporations,.0 
one company made the machines and the other handled sales. The 
negotiations evidently were in progress when Evans wrote to 
Mullins, telling him he was not going to pay him any more commis-
sions on the machines being built. This letter was dated 
August 23, 1968. It is interesting to note that in the merger 
agreement of the Evans Companies with Royal Industries, there 
appears to be a business cut-off date for the Evans Companies 
so that acquisition could be completed. That cut-off date is 
indicated in the document as August 31, 1968, a week after 
Evans1 letter (Exhibit D-45). 
It is obvious from the two documents that Evans, knowing 
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. -lis impending merger wi th Royal I n d u s t r i e s , d e s i r e d to seve r 
h i s re la t inn .shi f ...lit h Mull ins am,l n\i|i ill! I lit1 pi. j t i t s pe r son -
a l l y ^ 
Mull 1 11s responded by cash ing Evans1 check for the e a r n i n g s 
a l r e a d y due and 'wrote him a l e t t e r , denouncing Fn nans1 acteui'pl il in 
c a n c e l h i s agreement and o b j e c t i n g ' - mv t e r m i n a t i o n of h i s 
• - * - i.., Companies merged 
witr, doyai I n d u s t r i e s . 
1. IJI i ,"", ' , .1 at, Llie m a t t e r , de fendan t s c o n t i n u a l l y t r i e d 
to blame M u l l i n s t o r d e s i g n i n g a square shaH- in flip qe^meniHd 
r o l l e r as h i s i d e a (which i t was) , but which was c a u s i n g some 
i n i t i a l proh hnii'i in in mini" MJIH I Loimig oi uit1 iiiat ui i ieb, miiey claimed 
an o f t - s e t rn M u l l i n s 1 e a r n i n g s (R 952) . I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, 
howpver, t i l t , , u!L Lin saibt t ime, produced documents showing t h a t 
the square s i ^ t t concep t m tue mac- . . 
been p a t e n t e d hv a person a l l e g e d l y l i v i n g . * he Statt- -••" 
Texas .auenn appx. na-
t i o n shows \.re e x a c t des ign a- c machine -v.;i . ! by Mr* M u i i m b . 
T1-' . : - . , . « .o^-t-w, was immediate ly t r a n s f e r r e d >,\ 
the sa id Mr B r i r k n a - *-,- Mx. ^vauo 0 m - *• -i> - 1 
w i t h o u t tut knowledge of Mr. M u l l i n s ( E x h i b i t s P - 8 . D - . „ , 
* 639-646- - - - ' f s i ^
 A , , o u iioi ne 
p a t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n s 'were f i l e d on March 9, 1967 and bear L'hi 
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I 
signature of one of appellants1 counsel, Lynn G. Foster. He 
had drawings made at Mullins1 shop without his knowledge and 
thereafter, represented to the Patent Office that the square 
shaft concept of the machine, as well as the safety device and 
other matters, were the invention of the anonymous Floyd D. 
Brinkman. 
Shortly after Evans had attempted to cancel the commis-
sion contract, Royal Industries, through their accountants, 
Price Waterhouse 5c Co., and their coionsel made a thorough study 
and investigation of the records and accounts of both of the 
Evans Companies with the idea of a corporate acquisition of the 
same by way of merger. A Vice President of Royal Industries 
and a certified public accountant, by profession, Mr. Ted 
Freedman, reviewed the Evans records and proposed merger with 
other members of the corporation, their independent accountants, 
and legal counsel, and approved the same. Mr. Freedman testi-
fied on cross-examination that it was thought by Royal Industries 
that they were obtaining not only the assets, contracts and 
physical plant of the Evans Companies but also their liabili-
ties (R 909, 912, 919, 927 and 929)• Mr. Freedman also testified 
that although he did not know of the particular contractual 
agreement between the Evans Companies and Mr. Mullins for the 
two per cent commission, his company had fairly examined the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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\r were assuming ail ot the obligations 
as well as purchasing ail of the assets. 
Mr. Evans testified concerning the merger" agreement and 
s t a t e H C h H I R f > v < 1 1 T 1 1 1 J 1 1 s f, i: i «i" s II m. :,i i II . 1 II II "i >" II I II11" L e i: t) i; d s a ' I Lit! t: i me 
..: the proposed s a l e fo r t h e i r c o n s i d e r a t i on , He s t a t e d : 
" 0 . But you s a i d here today t h a t the con-
t r a c t m a t e r i a l and d a t a w i t h Mr. Mul l i ns 
was, 1 b e l i e v e , you s a i d , down i n the 
a rch iveso 
ffA. i ^9 what I mean i n the a r c h i v e s , a l l 
c t h a t s t u f f was i n f i l e i n o r d e r t h a t 
they had a c c e s s to a l l the r e c o r d s and 
the f i l e s of VH~ c o r p o r a t i o n , and they 
were a l : .« „ -emises . 
ffQ. A.,u ^ W:*-L*IK yoa s a i d m your depo&~. 
Lion they were aware of a l l t h i s -
t h a t r i g h t ? 
f!A# Ihey were aware ^) 
. £ t ^e time of t e s t i f y i n g , Mr. * -i; * ^ ^ r*-** r * < t 
of the Evans D i v i s i o n of Royai I n d u s t r i e s r: -
has twenty 1I,I,M In. > si mis , ^n^h i»avin.g i p r e s i d e n t ««I, i is 
r e s p e c t i v e d i v i s i o n (R 841 ) , In l a t e December of 14h ^*~ 
1 i.vi i I ,*• ans - > I'wii in I i.YRipaiiiea wei ii 1, i n a l I y merged i n t o Row 1 
I n d u s t r i e s ( E x h i b i t D-45) . Eoy a l I n d u s t r i e s p a r e - a s . ^ 
of the a s s e t s , c o n t r a c t s , accounts r e c e i v a b l e , agreements , 
l e a s e s , and a' •'" ? o b l i g a r i<•>iri si \ • ^a 
enumerated iii the agreement . The agreement . u i no t exc lude 
t hi I iiiiiii'tn mil n mi MulUiiii ( h x h i b i t l»—+"j , PB 1 8 ) . The Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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( 
merger agreement clearly reflects that it was to encompass all 
of the assets of the two Evans Companies, whether or not re-
flected in the balance sheet, and showed a balance sheet 
furnished by the Evans Companies as of August 31, 1968, showing 
Gross Sales of $926,124.00, with Gross Profits of $463,289.00 
to said date. The balance sheet also shows an Evans operating 
profit for the year ending August 31, 1968 of $217,771.00. 
The agreement further indicates in its body that there was a 
general assignment by the Evans Companies to Royal Industries 
of "all of its rights, title and interest to its agreement, 
contracts, ... with other parties, including but not limited 
to .... the exhibits and schedules thereto excepted ..." 
Thereafter, the document also listed a bill of sale and agree-
ment whereby Royal Industries acquired all contracts to which 
the Evans Companies were a party (Exhibit D-45). 
Evans then took over as President of the Evans Division 
of Royal Industries and continued to manufacture the pinch-
roller machine designed by Mr. Mullins. Production continued 
at the same address in Arizona with photographs and brochures 
of the same machine, the only change being the ownership shown 
as the Evans Division of Royal Industries (Exhibits P-5 and 
P-7). After repeated demands by Mullins for payment of his 
1 n 
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two per cent; commission, sui .t was brought for enforcement 
thereof • 
At the t ime the i n i t i a l machine was made for sa l e , 
$ 1 , 1 6 5 . 0 0 . Evans t e s t i f i e r t h a t in 19"*" * ^ machine^ vert 
sell! 1 Ii lg for a p p r o x i m a t e . . , • • * K. n d a n t s 1 
answers to i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s siiow j6b mau." * * 
1972 (R 9 1 ) . •/ ..,.,.- -. • -
'tiLons; however, al 1 46 i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s r e q u e s t e d by them were 
g i ve i i I i v I • I' i" :-1 -i i. I. 'J" 1.1ho u, t c h a n g e (l i J11 I J , "Hie y now c o m p l a i n 
t h a t t h e r e appea r s to be some ambiguity,. II shn> 
p o i n t e d ou t t h a t a p p e l l a n t s 1 counse l c i t e numerous s t a t e m e n t s 
of i"ai t conce rn ing mat. ne t s u mi dined who I I \ wi-Lhin a f t i d a v i t s 
or c o u n s e l ' s argument to the c o u r t and n o t p a r t of the r e c o r d . 
Thc-y L i t e Lhe same as a u t h o r i t y t o r a p p e l l a n t s 1 p o s i t i o n , none 
of s a i d arguments be ing ev idence (A 1»1H, [{ IllrfVi, l P " II",! 'H6, 
*."•-. ^ 4 U L , JOU, *5. At the conc lus ion ot the t r i a l and upon 
rece i j . i- i inm i pnjoipi ly , -im i in• 
r e q u e s t of a p p e l l a n t s , p o l l e o ir> j u r o r s . The v e r d i c t was 
unanimous {R 101 i ; • ' - ' •' - • • '•"' ' 
A f t e r appea l had been taker:, a f f i d a v i t s were fi led lr \ <" 
a p p e l l a n t s , one of which i s s igned by a j u n i o r a t t o r n e y In the 
o f f i c e of appe 11 a n t s , co\ inse II. He a 1 l e g e s l; hat , a j UTO m LO I i Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-gen rated OCR, may contain errors.
him certain information about the conduct of the jurors and 
thereafter, he attaches an unsigned affidavit, stating the 
juror would not sign the same (R 399 or 438). Such inadmissi-
ble self-serving hearsay is not worthy of further comment 
(Glazier vs. Cramm, 71 Utah 465, 267 P. 188). 
Counsel further recite in the factual statement the 
allegation of continued delays in the trial but without any 
reference to the record. The record will reflect there were 
no delays whatsoever. The trial commenced on a Monday morning 
and ran continuously through Thursday afternoon0 It was some 
time after five o!clock p.m. when all of the evidence was in 
and both sides rested their case. The record clearly reflects 
no unusual breaks, disturbances or anything of this nature. 
Counsel then indicate that because of the illness of the judge 
and his apparent inability to properly conclude the case, they 
had been deprived of a fair trial. Such is a "cheap shot11 at 
the trial judge and without merit. The record does not reflect 
any objections or motions for mistrial or any other complaints 
by counsel prior to the matter going to the jury. None in fact 
were made. 
The trial judge indicated that his father-in-law had 
passed away and he would need perhaps two days to make funeral 
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arrangements and to attend the funeral before concluding the 
case. The case was recessed Thursday evening at the conclusion 
of all evidence and both sides having rested. It reconvened 
the following Tuesday morning. In the meantime, an infection 
in the judgefs leg required that he be hospitalized for anti-
biotic treatment and rest. The judge made it clear he was 
under no sedatives or medication of any kind other than anti-
biotics although counsel attempt to so infer and did so state 
in their Motion for a New Trial (R 1042-1043). The trial 
judge prepared all of the jury instructions he intended to 
give to the jury and after signing them, delivered them to 
Judge Bryant H. Croft, the presiding Judge, for presentation 
to the jury. Counsel were fully informed of the fact that 
Judge Snow would not be instructing the jury but again, it is 
pointed out, no objection was raised to another judge instruct-
ing the jury nor were any motions made or objections taken. 
After counsel had reviewed the instructions, there were certain 
questions which came to mind and objections to be raised there-
to. Judge Croft then contacted Judge Snow by telephone and 
counsel were invited to go to the hospital and confer with 
Judge Snow on those objectionable instructions. Counsel did 
so* After approximately two hours of consultation, a recon-
sideration of some of the instructions was had and some were 
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deleted from the judge's proposed instructions at defendants1 
requests Thereafter, the instructions were again signed by 
Judge Snow with certain corrections and delivered to Judge 
Croft for reading to the jury (R 321), Judge Croft then con-
tacted Judge Snow by telephone to verify the fact that the 
instructions had been corrected and were ready to be given. 
He thereafter read the instructions to the jury# The only 
objections taken to the instructions by appdlants were those 
normal and usual exceptions after the juryfs retirement. No 
motions were made for a mistrial or complaints entered at that 
time (R 982). 
The instructions were then given to the jury who retired, 
deliberated and returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
They also answered the special interrogatories requested by 
appellants. 
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT AGAINST APPELLANTS. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTS! MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
POINT III 
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY WERE PROPER. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT AGAINST APPELLANTS. 
Ralph Evans and Mr. Mullins commenced the manufacture 
of the machine in question. It was the two individuals who 
were working together with the idea of future profits in mind. 
Thereafter, Evans formed two wholly owned family corporations 
to make and sell the machine in conjunction with Mullins1 
efforts (R 712, Exhibit D-45). At the commencement of their 
business relationship, Evans agreed that he offered a partner-
ship to Mullins and wanted him to move to Arizona. When this 
move was rejected, he indicated he would pay Mullins a percent-
age of the profits on the machine. He later reduced their 
agreement to writing (R 724-725, Exhibit P-3). After a short 
time, the two companies owned by Evans, his wife and children 
were sold to Royal Industries. Evans was asked: 
HQ. Was the R. M. Evans a corporation as 
such dissolved and the business pur-
chased by the Royal Industries? 
ffA. Yes. The assets were purchased by 
Royal Industries. 
ffQ. You mean the physical facilities as 
well as the customer business, etc.? 
ffA# That is right. 
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MQ. When the R. M. Evans Corporation was 
sold to Royal Industries, that is, 
their assets, did you sell all of 
the R0 M. Evans Company to Royal 
Industries? 
"A. Yes. 
"Qo So the R. M. Evans Corporation now 
is merely a shell with no business 
or assets? 
"A. That is right. 
ftQ. Or customers or anything of that 
nature? 
"A. That is right. 
!lQo Could you tell us if the facili-
ties of the Evans Company, by that, 
I mean the physical plant, etc., 
the equipment, etc. -- did all of 
this go with the sale to the Royal 
Industries? 
fiA. Yes. 
flQ# Was there anything withheld by the 
R0 M, Evans Corporation other than 
the corporate name when it was sold 
to Royal Industries? 
"A. No.11 (R 710-711) 
Thereafter, the machine in question was manufactured 
and sold from the same plant using the same employees and the 
same advertising brochures, with the exception of a sLight 
change in name (Exhibits P-5 and P-7). 
Royal Industries agreed to purchase the Evans Companies, 
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lock, stock and barrel (Exhibit D-45). Royal assumed all 
contractual obligations of the Evans Companies after August 
31, 1968 (Exhibit D-45). The machines produced thereafter 
were subject to the two per cent commission agreement as a 
contractual obligation assumed by Royal under the merger 
agreement (Exhibit D-45). Mr. Ted Freedman, the corporate 
Vice President of Royal Industries, testified as follows: 
"Qo In the case of buying these assets 
of these two corporations, did the 
negotiations concern also assuming 
some of the liabilities or all of 
the liabilities of these two 
corporations? 
!fA0 Yes, the negotiations did involve 
that. 
ffQo Was that considered part of the 
purchase price? 
ffA0 Yes." (R 909) 
Mr. Alton Cherry, a former stockholder of the Evans 
Companies, testified that meetings were held with the Evans 
corporation officers, and at those meetings, they did discuss 
the fact that they were selling both assets and liabilities. 
He was asked by appellants1 own counsel on direct examination 
as follows: 
flQ. You, then as a stockholder—a for-
mer stockholder—of R. M. Evans 
Company, you have any knowledge as 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the nature of the sale to Royal 
Industries; was that a sale of the 
business, sale of the assets? 
ffA0 Oh, my understanding is--as a stock-
holder, I sat in on the majority of 
the meetings—and it was a sale of 
everything. It was a sale of assets; 
liabilities were assumed/1 (Emphasis 
supplied.) (R 803) 
Mr. Freedman understood that Royal Industries was buying 
all of the assets, liabilities and contracts of the Evans 
Companies. He further testified; 
flQ. Did you understand from the investi-
gation and your inquiry of the matter 
that there had been a full disclosure 
so far as Royal Industries knew of 
all liabilities and assets, and also 
of all contract obligations which 
would be a part of that agreement? 
ffA. Yes, that was my understanding. And 
I had no reason to not believe that 
that was the case.11 (R 912) 
Mr. Freedman then went on to discuss the various account-
ants and other persons employed to review all of the corporate 
records. He was further asked on cross-examination: 
"Q. And it was Royal's understanding at 
the time they made the purchase of 
these two corporations controlled by 
Mr. Evans that they were buying assets, 
liabilities, physical plant, everything, 
is that true, except for the stock? 
MA. Well, it was my understanding we were 
buying the assets, liabilities as dis-
closed to us." 
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He further testified: 
ffQa And you thought at that time, didn!t 
you, Mr, Freedman, that you were 
getting all of the liabilities as 
revealed by the company records? 
ffA. We had no reason to believe that 
they were not all the liabilities. 
lfQ« The fact still remains, does it not, 
Mr. Freedman, when the deal was made 
your company thought they were getting 
all of the liabilities and the assets 
in one lump; that is true, is it not? 
ffA. Yes. We thought that the liabilities 
were all that the Evans Companies had." 
(R 919, 927 and 929) 
Ralph Evans testified that all of the records were avail-
able for review, including the Mullins agreement. He thought 
they had been thoroughly reviewed by Royal personnel or account-
ants on their behalf prior to the purchase (R 899, 962, 963 and 
964). 
As far as all of the parties to the merger were concerned, 
there had been a complete purchase of the corporations and a 
merger of all assets, liabilities, contracts, etc. The agreement 
specifically recited an assumption of "all of its rights, title 
and interest to its agreement, contracts, ... with other parties 
...." (Exhibit D-45). 
The Mullins agreement recites unequivocally that Mullins 
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would receive a two per cent commission on the sales price of 
the machine. It states "As agreed, we will pay you a two per 
cent (2%) commission on all EVANS EZY-BOND PINCH ROLLERS manu-
factured in Glendale, Arizona0lf (Exhibit P-3) If there is 
ambiguity in the amount of commission to be paid, said ambiguity 
should be resolved against the appellants as the contract was 
drawn by them (Seal vs. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P. 2d 
503). 
It is generally held that where a corporation merges or 
purchases all of the assets and assumes the obligations and 
contracts of another corporation, said acquisition includes all 
obligations, whether they are inadvertently omitted from a list 
or not. See Sudakovich vs. Central Bank of Bingham, 62 Utah 24, 
218 P.2d 113, wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
f,We do not agree with appellantfs conten-
tion that the defendant assumed only such 
liabilities as were listed and acknowledged. 
There was no limitation expressed in the 
offer of defendant and it must have been 
understood by the receiver, the bank 
commissioners, and the court as well, that 
the settlement included every person who 
might be found to be a depositor with the 
bank.11 
In the instant case, Royal has clearly indicated in its 
agreement of merger that it was buying everything except those 
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certain enumerated obligations. The Mullins contract was not 
excluded. See also annotations at 15 ALR 1181 and 149 ALR 816* 
See also Hogan vs. Price River Irrigation Company, 55 Utah 170, 
184 P. 536; Forbes vs. Thorpe, 209 Mass. 570, 95 N.E. 955, 
In the Forbes case, supra, the Massachusetts court ruled 
that where all assets are transferred to another corporation, 
together with liabilities expressly assumed, said corporation 
cannot retain the property acquired and at the same time avoid 
the payment of the debts which it agreed to pay as part of the 
purchase price simply because the amount of the debt was mis-
represented. The court stated the purchaser clearly cannot 
keep the advantages of a transaction and avoid the obligations. 
In appellants1 brief, they cite the case of Parker vs. 
Telegift International, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 87, 505 P.2d 301. 
That case is not in any way comparable in facts with the instant 
case. In Parker, only the stock was sold, not its assets, con-
tracts, or liabilities. In the instant case, appellant, Royal 
Industries, purchased everything. We would also agree with the 
general rule that where a corporation purchases nothing but 
assets and excludes contracts, obligations, and other liabili-
ties, such may be done if valid consideration is given to the 
stockholders of the selling corporation. The general rule is 
cited in Cooper vs. Utah Power & Light Company. 35 Utah 570, 
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102 P.202 that there is no presumption that obligations are 
assumed by purchase of assets only. However, in the instant 
case, the merger agreement was intended to assume and merge 
all of the assets, liabilities, and contracts. For this rea-
son, Ralph Evans, individually, and Royal Industries are liable 
to the plaintiff to perform their obligations under the contract. 
From 1969 to April of 1972, 350 machines had been manufac-
tured and sold (R 974-975). Evans claimed that during 1972, they 
had lost some customers because of problems with the roller de-
vice in the machine and the company loss was about $40,000*00 in 
sales. At that time (1972), the machine was selling for about 
$2,000.00 (R 955-956). Evans admitted that at no time did Mullins 
ever tell him he would guarantee the machine to work without hav-
ing problems (R 958). The selling price of the machine continued 
to climb as the inflationary trend progressed (R 932). On Page 
22 of appellants1 brief, they represent to the court that there 
are at least 393 machines sold and that a minimum amount owing to 
Mullins under the contract would be $9,156.90, computing the 
commission at the sale price in 1968. They totally disregard the 
fact that the contract calls for a 2% commission on the sale 
price of each machine. Appellants1 interrogatories asked the 
jury this specific question* See Interrogatory No. 2 (R 481). 
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The jurors answered said question in the affirmative (R 578)9 
Tte jurors also found in Interrogatory No. 1 that appellant 
Evans personally agreed to pay two per cent commission to 
Mullins* 
From the time the machines were originally constructed 
until April of 1972, there were almost 400 machines soldo 
This was for a period of approximately 3-1/2 years. From 
April of 1972 until the time of trial, late June of 1975, 
another three years had elapsed. From this, the jurors could 
easily conclude that approximately 400 more machines had been 
made and sold if not more. The machines were being sold around 
the world* 
Appellants1 counsel cites part of the argument to the 
jury given by counsel for the respondent wherein a $40.00 com-
mission figure was used as part of counselfs argument to the 
jury. This was based upon a sale figure in 1972 of $2,000.00. 
The argument, of course, was in no way an indication to the 
jury that this was the maximum amount coming to Mr0 Mullins but 
merely given to the jurors and so understood as an approxima-
tion of the amount of commissions due at the time of the answers 
to interrogatories in 1972. 
The appellants were in sole and complete control of the 
books concerning the number of machines manufactured and the 
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gross sales figures on the machine. Counsel suggests that a 
post-judgment accounting was made establishing the number of 
machines actually sold to the date of trial. The only account-
ing claimed to have been made by the appellants is a self-serving 
affidavit by one of the appellants, Ralph Evans. The affidavit 
was signed on the 8th day of April, 1976, claiming a certain 
number of machines had been sold. This affidavit was filed 
almost nine months after the case had been tried. It was not 
filed in accordance with any order of the court for an account-
ing nor was it filed at the request of the plaintiff. It was 
a self-serving affidavit filed after the case was on appeal, 
apparently in an attempt to influence this Court, although not 
part of the trial evidence (R 1062). Plaintiff tried to estab-
lish the current selling price of the machine at the time of 
trial but appellants objected thereto and the court sustained 
the objection (R 956). Appellants were and are in sole posses-
sion of all of the documentation as to selling price. Because 
of their own objections, appellants refused to allow respondent 
to elicit the sales figures from appellants1 office personnel. 
They were asked to produce the sales evidence on the number of 
machines sold to date of trial and the sales figures as they 
were in sole and exclusive possession of the same. They refused 
to do so. The evidence in their exclusive control was purposely 
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withheld. There was evidence as to the number of machines sold 
through April of 1972. The jury was then required to estimate 
those sold in the future because of the conduct of the appellants 
of which they now complaint (R 770 to 776). 
It is the universal rule that where one party is in sole 
and exclusive possession of evidence pertaining to an accounting 
or partnership case and refuses or fails to divulge that evidence, 
the jury may conclude from what reasonable evidence is available 
what the damages are. In such an event, the party withholding 
the evidence is not thereafter permitted to complain of the 
juryfs findings where said party deliberately withheld the evi-
dence. See Fernandez vs. Garza, 88 Ariz. 214, 354 P02d 260 
(Supreme Court of Arizona-1960). The Arizona Supreme Court 
stated: 
flThe defendant urges that since it cannot 
be ascertained exactly how the sum of 
$34,952.25 was derived, the judgment 
cannot stand; but we do not think that 
is a sufficient reason to upset the judg-
ment. In Mollahan vs. Christy, 80 Ariz. 
141, 294 P.2d 375, where the parties were 
joint venturers, we said that the plain-
tiff who had placed his affairs in the 
hands of the defendant was entitled to an 
accounting and the burden was on the 
defendant to support with competent evi-
dence the disbursements made. This is in 
accordance with the rule that since a 
managing partner occupies the position 
analogous to that of a trustee, he is 
charged with the burden of making a faith-
ful and true accounting." (Emphasis supplied.) Digitize  by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The court then went on to state: 
"It has also been held that the burden 
of producing evidence at a trial should 
be shifted once it is shown that the 
defendants control over the accounts 
was exclusive.ff (Wilson vs. Mo line, 
229 Minn. 164, 38 N.W.2d 201.) 
It is respectfully submitted that there was ample evi-
dence to show that at least in 1972, the sale price on the 
machine in question was $2,000.00 and there had been sold 
approximately 385 machines. The jurors well could have con-
cluded that at least a like amount of machines were made in 
the following three years and sold at a price admittedly in 
excess of $2,000.00 per machine. It was the statement of 
appellant Evans that the price continuously rose on the ma-
chines due to inflation. 
In any event, it was the duty of the appellants who 
were in exclusive control of the records to bring forth the 
records during the time of trial as to the actual total gross 
sales figure on the machine in question. They refused to do 
so. They therefore should not now be allowed to complain,, 
According to Exhibit D-45, the merger agreement, the 
financial statement of the Evans Companies show that they were 
grossing in sales in excess of $900,000.00 a year at the time 
of the merger. There is ample evidence from the figures given 
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at the time of trial from which a jury could conclude that well 
over $50,000.00 in commissions was owing to Mr0 Mullins for 
6-1/2 years of sales0 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTSf MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
The appellants, after the juryfs verdict had been rendered, 
then moved for a new trial, claiming ambiguities in interrogator-
ies and the answers given thereto. In their brief, they recite 
those to which they object. 
Interrogatory No. 24, as referred to on Page 42 of their 
brief, asks whether or not plaintiff Mullins was paid by 
Mr. Evans personally to which the jurors answered flNo.M The 
uncontradicted evidence was that the checks were drawn on the 
corporate account and the jurors obviously so found0 
Interrogatory No. 25 asks whether or not Mullins was 
paid by the corporation* The jurors answered "Yes11 to this 
question which obviously is correct---the funds were paid in 
the form of corporate checks from the Evans family-owned corpora-
tion. 
No. 26 asks whether or not the plaintiff was providing 
services in the manufacture of the machine for the Evans 
Corporation to which the jurors answered "Yes." Obviously, 
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Mr0 Mullins started his work with Mr. Evans personally and 
after the incorporation, continued working with Mr* Evans and 
for his family corporation. There is nothing inconsistent 
about this answer. 
Question No. 27 asks whether or not Mr. Mullins was 
also providing services in developing the machine for Mr. Evans 
as an individual to which the jurors answered "Yes." The evi-
dence is clear that such was the case. Mr. Evans, as an 
individual, solicited Mullins to help make the machine and also, 
later on informed him that he and his family had formed a 
corporation for the production and sale of the machine. There 
is no inconsistency in the answer. 
On Pages 42 and 43 of their brief, they refer to the 
answers given to Interrogatory Numbers 1 and 30. Their ques-
tions are ambiguous in that they refer to certain payments but 
do not specify what payments. The jurors answered these ques-
tions; however, the interrogatories were requested by appellants 
and they should not now be allowed to complain about their con-
struction 
They complain about the answer to Interrogatory No* 1 
wherein the jurors found that there was a contract entered into 
whereby Mullins was to be paid two per cent of the sales price 
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of the machine to which the jurors answered ffYes0fl There appears 
to be nothing ambiguous about that answer0 
In regard to Interrogatory No, 28, the jurors answered the 
question as being "Undecided." Appellants were apparently asking 
the jurors to make a determination as to what the thoughts were 
of Mr. Mullins. The jurors apparently had not decided what his 
thoughts were and evidently found the question ambiguous,, 
Question No. 29 complained of is also consistent with the 
other answers given by the jurors. The question asks whether or 
not the plaintiff understood that defendant Evans was acting 
solely in his capacity as an officer of the corporation to which 
the jurors answered ffN0o,f He was also acting on his own behalf0 
On Page 45 of their brief, they complain about an answer 
given to Interrogatory No. 43 wherein it was asked of the jurors 
if Royal Industries knowingly agreed to assume and fulfill the 
terms of a letter memorandum dated April 11, 1967. The jurors 
answered "No*11 One of the witnesses for Royal Industries stated 
that he did not knowingly recall the particular agreement with 
Mr0 Mullins at the time of the merger. Evans said the Mullins 
agreement was available for review along with the other corporate 
records. The jurors1 answer in such event was not inconsistent. 
This does now however mean that the merger agreement and the 
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understanding of the parties did not contemplate the acceptance 
of the Mullins' contract in accordance with the terms and pro-
visions of Exhibit D-45. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that judgments will be 
sustained if supported by any substantial evidence and reason-
able inferences to be drawn therefrom. Jensen vs. Eddy, 30 Utah 
2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142. 
This Court has also stated that the amount of damages 
awarded by a jury is a matter of discretion. Hirabelli vs. 
Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138 P. 1172. 
It has also repeatedly been held that a jury's conduct 
cannot be impeached by affidavits of the jurors unless their 
conduct is the direct result of a quotient or chance verdict. 
A juror is not permitted to impeach a verdict by giving an affi-
davit that the other jurors did not understand the evidence. 
Stringham vs. Broderick, 529 P„2d 425; Vernon Smith vs. Wilmer 
Barnett, 17 Utah 2d 240, 408 P.2d 709; Hathaway vs. Marks, 21 
Utah 2d 33, 439 P.2d 850. Nor will the courts go behind the 
jury's answers to interrogatories to analyze or speculate as to 
the manner in which the jurors arrived at their decision. 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District vs. Nelson, supra. See 
also Hepworth vs. Covey Brothers Amusement Company, 97 Utah 205, 
91 P.2d 507. All of the issues raised by appellants in their 
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Motion for a New Trial were duly considered by the trial court. 
The motion was denied, and properly so. 
POINT III 
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY WERE PROPER. 
The instructions given to the jury were almost verbatim 
as requested by appellants herein. Of course, the court did 
give some of respondents requests and denied others. 
On Page 26 of appellants1 brief, they continually refer 
to the courtfs preparation of the instructions in the hospital. 
Such is not the case. The instructions were prepared by Judge 
Snow and given to Judge Croft before Judge Snow went into the 
hospital. The only discussions about instructions in the hospital 
were those discussions concerning certain objections that appel-
lants voiced about the instructions which were reviewed by Judge 
Snow at the hospital. Some of the courtfs instructions were 
omitted by agreement of counsel and the court. 
Appellants complain of Instruction No. 30. This instruction 
told the jurors that if they found the issues in favor of respond-
ent, they should, by a preponderance of the evidence, determine 
the machines sold and the amount of damages suffered by respond-
ent. There was nothing erroneous in this instruction. The argu-
ment against giving such an instruction by appellants is based 
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solely on their own view of the evidence and obviously not 
based upon the evidence as found by the jurors. 
Instruction No. 31 to which they object is clearly the 
law. It merely tells the jurors that since defendants drew the 
agreement, any ambiguity should be resolved against them0 This 
is fundamental contract law. Seal vs. Tayco, Inc., supra. 
Appellants attempt to claim that Royal Industries should not be 
held to the same burden of the instruction since it merely 
assumed the agreement by contract and was not a party to it. It 
is respectfully submitted that Royal assumed the agreement and 
all of the necessary rights and obligations therein. They cer-
tainly are not in the position to claim that any ambiguities 
should be resolved in their favor. 
Instruction No. 32, which was objected to by appellants, 
correctly states the law. The court instructed the jurors that 
if they found that Royal Industries purchased the obligations 
and assets of the Evans Companies that they may have acquired 
the obligation, either expressly or by implication, and could 
become legally responsible. The facts clearly indicate by the 
merger agreement and testimony that there was such an assumption 
of obligations and contracts and such instruction was clearly 
the law of the case (Exhibit D-45). 
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Instruction No0 33 merely told the jurors that in such 
an acquisition, as is evidenced by Exhibit D-45, there was a 
merger or as such, the transaction amounted to a merger, and 
that Royal Industries not only acquired the assets of the Evans 
Companies but also acquired their contractual obligations* This, 
of course, is the law* 
Counsel then complains of the instructions regarding 
merger or acquisition of assets and cites Parker vs* Telegift 
International, Inc0, supra, which has previously been referred 
to and is not appropriate to the facts of this case* In the 
Parker case, there was no transfer of assets, contracts, obli-
gations, or anything of this nature. It was merely a purchase 
of corporate stock* 
Instruction No* 34 applied to Mr, Evans as he later on 
admittedly became what was termed as the President of the Evans 
Division of Royal Industries and as such, managed the division* 
This was the division which continued making the machine in 
question and any conduct and knowledge of Mr* Evans after that 
time became the conduct of the corporation. This instruction 
referred to his knowledge of machine sales* 
Instruction No* 35 is merely a recitation of what is the 
law* The corporation, Royal Industries, obviously intended to 
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purchase all of the contracts of the Evans Companies and knew, 
or should have known, when they purchased everything but three 
or four enumerated obligations, as set forth in the purchase 
agreement, they were purchasing the Mullins obligation. They 
cannot accept the benefits of producing the Mullins machine 
without paying his commission. Their own merger document, 
Exhibit D-45, clearly shows their intention to acquire all con-
tractual obligations regardless of those being enumerated and 
it specifically excluded only certain obligations involving 
potential litigation. The Mullins agreement was not so listed 
and therefore, logically must be assumed to have been part of 
the purchase agreement and merger. 
Instruction No. 36 merely told the jurors that they 
were to assess the damages in the event of a finding in favor 
of the plaintiff and the damages should be two per cent of the 
sales price of each machine# Such was the interpretation placed 
on the agreement by appellants in their request to the court 
for answers to certain interrogatories. The court, in addition 
thereto, told the jurors that in the event the value of the 
machine and its sales price fell below the figure of $1,165.00, 
that such an award should be made on the lesser price. 
It would logically follow that in the event the price 
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went above this figure, the jurors would also assess damages 
accordinglyo 
In reference to Instruction No. 39, the jurors again 
were told that if it was the intent of all of the parties 
concerned that the two per cent commission was to carry over 
to whoever made the machine by virtue of authority from 
Evans that said commission would apply. The jurors also were 
clearly told they must make such a finding of fact before they 
should find the issues against Evans personally. The jurors 
so found. It should also again be noted that the agreement 
about which the court was talking refers to Evans and his 
corporations as ffwe,fl indicating more than one party was to be 
bound (Exhibit P-3)o 
In Instruction No. 41, the court gave the general in-
struction to the jury regarding knowledge of corporate officers 
concerning business of the corporation. Such is a generally 
acknowledged stock instruction and a correct statement of the 
law. It not only applied to Evans but to other officers of 
Royal Industries that searched the records of the Evans 
Companies in preparation for the merger agreement, and so testi-
fied. 
Appellants then complain about certain requested instruc-
tions that were not given by the court. They object to their 
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Requested Instruction No0 19 as not having been given* This 
request is both ambiguous and effectually takes away the 
issue of facts from the jury and was properly refused. 
Requested Instruction No. 29 is also tantamount to a 
directed verdict and was properly refused* There obviously 
were many issues of fact to be decided by the jury as was 
evidenced by appellants1 request that the court submit 46 
special interrogatories to determine these issues* The court 
granted their request and gave all the special interrogatories. 
Requested Instruction No. 31 also was tantamount to a 
directed verdict as to certain issues and was properly refused. 
In reference to Requested Instruction No. 33, the court 
essentially instructed the jury on all of the issues contained 
therein. The request however contains certain phraseology which 
takes away from the jury certain issues of fact and was adequately 
covered in the other instructions. 
Requested Instruction No. 34 also was properly refused 
in that the court covered the issues encompassed within said 
request in other instructions and said request ignored the 
family ownership of the Evans companies and other pertinent 
matters. 
The other requested instructions by the appellants were 
given in substance as they pertain to the issues but insofar as 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
they were couched in such terms as to be inadequate, they 
were properly refused* 
Appellants further claim that the jurors1 answers to 
the special interrogatories requested by them were inconsistento 
This matter has been reviewed previously herein and no further 
comment deemed necessary0 The question of whether or not there 
was an agreement by Mullins to accept payment from Evans in 
full as claimed was decided by the jurors1 answers to special 
interrogatories where they found the issues in favor of Mullins* 
They were issues of fact and disposed of the matter of accord, 
satisfaction or release0 
Appellants further claim there was no consideration to 
support the contractual agreement for the payment of the two 
per cent commission* The evidence is virtually uncontradicted 
that Evans wanted Mullins to become a partner with him in the 
construction of the machine and when Mullins refused to move 
his residence and quit his job to become such a partner, it was 
then decided that in exchange for his design ideas, work and 
other development efforts, he should receive the TL commission* 
Some payments were actually made by appeHants0 Mullins 
accepted the same and is still willing to accept his commissions 
as payment for his development of the machine. The jurors so 
found. Counsel claims that Mullins held the property of Evans 
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and, in effect, exacted an agreement from him to pay commissions 
before he would release the unfinished machines, jigs, and other 
toolSo The jury found to the contrary*. 
Counsel then claims that the selling agreement and com-
mission payments were only to be made as long as they were 
manufactured by Evans« The facts clearly indicate they are 
still being manufactured under Evans Division of Royal Industries 
which was a merger of the Evans Companies. They are being made 
at the same place of business as they were originally manu-
factured in Arizona and even using the same photographs, name, 
etc., as previously indicated. Such an argument is without 
merit. The jurors so found in their answers to appellants1 
interrogatories. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is respectfully represented by 
respondent herein that he was the victim of sharp practices from 
beginning to end. His partner, Evans, through legal counsel, 
Lynn Go Foster, made drawings of the machine being developed 
by Mullins and submitted the same for patent without Mullins1 
knowledge. The patent was placed in the name of a third party 
with an immediate transfer to Evans upon its issuance to cir-
cumvent any claim by Mullins. This is very clearly documented 
in the evidence. Not knowing all the facts, Mullins agreed to 
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accept two per cent of the sales price of each machine sold 
by Evans and his companies as adequate consideration for 
Mullins1 inventive efforts* Damages were so awarded by the 
jury. 
The merger with Royal Industries by Evans and his 
family-owned companies did not change the agreement in any 
manner. The merger agreement fully contemplated an assumption 
of all contracts. 
The evidence is clear that almost 400 machines were 
made prior to the answers to interrogatories in April 1972 and 
three years further production and sales were as yet unaccounted 
for. Appellants steadfastly refused to produce evidence as to 
what the sales figures were to allow the jury to give an exact 
verdict if they saw fit. They required the jurors to calculate 
the production based upon the answers to interrogatories as to 
prior sales figures and the increase in prices and award a judg-
ment accordingly. They should not now be allowed to complain of 
such calculations through their own misconduct. The verdict and 
judgment rendered in the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BAYLE AND LAUCHNOR 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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